Theo de Raadt wrote:
>> big clue is having file access and network access in the same process.
> 
>    ^^^ Correct, because 90% of the attack surface remains if a process
>    has both of those.

Some developers are happy as long as the program works, even if the 
security design is poor. You see the same thing on Linux, where 
AppArmor, SELinux, and similar tools are added around applications that 
still keep filesystem and network access in the same process.

It seems they kept everything in one process and one configuration file 
simply because it was easier than redesigning the application. I do not 
understand the obsession with having fewer files or processes. It does 
not meaningfully reduce compile time or resource usage, and it offers no 
security benefit. Proper privilege separation, on the other hand, can 
greatly reduce the attack surface.